

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505


National Intelligence Council

27 August 1982

Dear Dr. Ellison:

Attached is our response to your letter of 7 July asking for information on Pacific sea lines of communications. Although the attached was prepared in answer to a broader question than you posed, it does encompass most of what you want. See page 34 in particular.

Yours sincerely,



David D. Gries
NIO for East Asia

Attachment
As Stated

Dr. John N. Ellison
Deputy Director
Mobilization Concepts Development Center
National Defense University
Washington, D. C. 20319



Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret

25

International Economic & Energy Weekly

18 June 1982

Secret

GI IEEW 82-025
18 June 1982

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30 July 1982


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of East Asia Analysis

SUBJECT : Attached Request from National Defense University

Although the requests made in the attached letter are ambiguous, I have refined them through several exchanges and phone calls. What is needed is a three or four page paper that answers the following questions:

- What are the priority sea lanes between East Asia and the US and Indian Ocean areas?
- What are the choke points on those sealanes?
- What would be the impact of interdiction?
- What alternate sources are there in case of interdiction?
- What is the role of stockpiling? ✓

I am tardy on pursuing this and would appreciate anything you can do to produce a memorandum fairly quickly.


David D. Gries
NIO for East Asia

MEMORANDUM FOR:

energy & raw materials
what are the priority seelanes
between East Asia & the US
and Indian Ocean areas
what are the choke points on
those seelanes
what would be the impact of
interdiction
what alternate sources are
there in case of interdiction
what is the role of stockpiling

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GPO : 1981 O - 345-783



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
MOBILIZATION CONCEPTS DEVELOPMENT CENTER
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

REPLY TO
 ATTENTION OF:

MCDC-SF

7 July 1982

SUBJECT: Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Study for the Commander
 of Pacific Command (CINCPAC)

Central Intelligence Agency
 National Intelligence Office for East Asia
 Room 7E62
 Langley, Virginia 22101

*Susan
 hold for
 6 months*

Dear Mr. Griese:

This letter is in response to your request to provide you an insight into the Mobilization Concepts Development Center's (MCDC) study on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for the Commander of Pacific Command (CINCPAC). I have also inclosed a copy of the MCDC-CINCPAC joint study plan.

The growing economic interdependence of the U.S. and allied countries on the Pacific Basin has established a complex structure of distribution and markets which, if disrupted, would pose serious economic and security problems. CINCPAC has the responsibility to maintain secure SLOCs that are essential for critical trade with that region. The forces available for this purpose are limited and coupled with a growing threat from the U.S.S.R., it is of the utmost concern for CINCPAC to manage their resources effectively.

This study will provide CINCPAC planning groups a method of determining the priorities for SLOC protection, when they must be defended and for how long. The focus will be to determine the relative criticality of materials, energy and manufactured goods moved through SLOCs linking the U.S. and its allies with the Pacific and Indian Ocean producing and marketing areas. Of major concern is the potential disruptions of SLOCs essential to U.S. and allied defense production, civilian industries and their economies during an emergency.

The Center would appreciate your assistance in providing any data that you may have to help us assess SLOC criticality and their impact on U.S. and allied interest. The persons to contact regarding this study effort are Mr. Robert C. Fabrie and LTC Robert R. Rumph, USA, on 693-8683.

Sincerely,

Douglas B. Blackburn
 DOUGLAS B. BLACKBURN
 Director

1 Incl
 as

17 June 1982

MCDC-CINCPAC JOINT STUDY PLAN
CRITICAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC)

Purpose: To develop a conceptual planning model and rationale and to present recommendations to assist planning in the identification, prioritization, management and allocation of resources to assure continued flow of and access to critical materials.

Scope: A joint MCDC-CINCPAC study of key commodities, trade flows, and economic interdependence patterns affecting CINCPAC strategic and contingency planning to protect U.S. and allied interests.

The study efforts will encompass the collection of data from appropriate sources on raw material, economic and trade flows in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The principal responsibility of MCDC will be the analyses of those data and the assessments of criticality to U.S. and allied defense production, essential civilian needs and selected weapon systems.


In order to facilitate the translation of these factors into CINCPAC planning a decision model will be developed to identify and prioritize, over time, key commodities, trade distribution patterns, and their strategic and economic impact on U.S. and allied interest. A tentative schedule of work is as follows:


<u>Task</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
1. Development of Study Plan	15 July 1982
2. Data collection, analyses and progress briefing to CINCPAC	15 August 1982
3. Data collection, analyses and draft report	15 September 1982
4. CINCPAC presentation, review and final report	15 October 1982

Report Format:

It is anticipated that the executive summary and report will be approximately 15 to 20 pages with additional appendices for detail analysis and backup of report findings and recommendations. It may include additional recommendations and CINCPAC study opportunities in the areas of future regional economic trends, alternate sources of supply, and economic implications inherent to the development of multi-national strategies and contingency planning. It is anticipated that MCDC will also provide briefing materials and consultation to complement the study report.

- Responsibilities: In the accomplishment these tasks will require the full cooperation of CINCPAC and may include access to necessary data related to CINCPAC operational planning and concepts and regional SLOC structures. It is anticipated that MCDC will visit CINCPAC at least two times in order to accomplish needed analyses, provide a progress briefing, coordinate the draft report and brief the final report. It is also expected that MCDC will be provided necessary points of contact responsible for extending CINCPAC planning and intelligence if required to complete the research effort. Also connectivity with relevant Federal agencies and research institutions for detailed CINCPAC contingency planning will be provided. CINCPAC will determine the distribution of the final report.


R. W. CHEWNING
Rear Admiral, USN
Director for Plans and Policy


Dr. John N. Ellison
Deputy Director
Mobilization Concepts Development Center
National Defense University